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User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’
Decision Process about Consensually Acquired
Spyware
NATHANIEL GOOD, JENS GROSSKLAGS, DAVID THAW,
AARON PERZANOWSKI, DEIRDRE MULLIGAN, JOSEPH KONSTAN∗
ABSTRACT
Spyware is software which monitors user actions, gathers personal
data, and/or displays advertisements to users. While some
spyware is installed surreptitiously, a surprising amount is
installed on users’ computers with their active participation. In
some cases, users agree to accept spyware as part of a software
bundle as a cost associated with gaining functionality they desire.
In many other cases, however, users are unaware that they
installed spyware, or of the consequences of that installation. This
lack of awareness occurs even when the functioning of the spyware
is explicitly declared in the end user license agreement (EULA).
We argue and demonstrate that poor interface design contributes
to the difficulty end users experience when trying to manage their
computing environment. This paper reviews the legal, technical,
and design issues related to the installation of spyware bundled
with other software. It reports on results of an experiment in
which thirty-one users were asked to configure computers,
deciding which software to install from a set of software that
included disclosed spyware. The results suggest that current
EULA interfaces do little to encourage informed decision-making
and that simpler interfaces with key terms highlighted have
potential to improve informed decision-making.

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years spyware has emerged as a significant
new threat to Internet-connected computers. We use the term
"spyware" to describe a class of software that resides on an
individual's computer, using the resources of that computer to monitor
the user's actions, display advertisements to the user, and/or engage in
other activities commonly perceived by users as invasive or
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undesirable. Amazingly, these types of programs may reside on up to
88% of all internet-connected computers [5].
Spyware and tools for managing it highlight an interesting junction
of legal, technical, and HCI (human-computer interaction) research.
While some spyware is installed unknowingly by users when they
install freeware or shareware, or when they execute downloads
transmitted through email, the web, or instant messages, much
spyware is installed with the user's participation—it is installed during
a software installation process that is apparent to the user and during
which the program’s actions including spyware behaviors are
disclosed. Indeed, the reason that spyware is difficult to accurately
define is that the same piece of software may be considered
unacceptable spyware by one user, an acceptable trade for other
services by another, or a valuable personalization system or notifier by
a third. Consider Google's Toolbar (toolbar.google.com) which
explicitly asks for permission to monitor user web browsing so that it
can provide more information to the user about the page being viewed.
Because of this user-centered definition of what constitutes
spyware, for some portion of software that meets the definition of
spyware, it seems inappropriate to adopt an outright ban. Early efforts
to combat spyware—much like anti-virus software efforts—measured
their success based on how infrequently the software was installed.
While such a measure can help provide security, it may also limit
users access to certain software combinations by denying them the
opportunity to trade some privacy, speed, or attention for services or
information they actually value. Imagine if your computer "protected"
you by preventing you from ever transmitting your credit card
information over the Internet; it would perhaps reduce your
vulnerability to identity theft, but would at the same time deny you the
benefits of shopping online. In the case of spyware, it isn't simply that
the monitoring or notifications themselves may be valuable. Anecdotal
evidence suggests, and our study confirms, that some users are willing
to install spyware when the desired application with which it is
bundled is of perceived high utility, and a comparable product without
spyware is unavailable or unknown to the user [9]. In other words, at
least in situations where users are unaware of other options, they are
willing to give up some privacy, screenspace, or bandwidth as
"payment" for an unrelated service or product they value.
Accordingly, managing spyware requires that we engage the user
in controlling their desktop instead of assuming we can simply do it
for them. The End User Licensing Agreement, Terms of Service,
Privacy Policy, or some combination (EULA herein) is the most
common format for disclosing information about software behavior.
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EULAs fail to engage users in the process of controlling the security
and privacy settings of their computers, perhaps intentionally.
Substantial evidence demonstrates that users rarely read long legal
documents—such as EULAs—particularly when displayed in small
windows and in a manner that interrupts the installation process.
Providing information and requiring the user to acknowledge its
receipt prior to installation appears to be the correct approach for
several reasons (including the difficulty of uninstalling software
programs), but current EULAs, driven largely by legal concerns, do
not foster end user control over the desktop. Users typically either do
not read or do not understand EULAs. In addition, businesses, and to a
lesser extent other end users, are paying dearly for the proliferation of
spyware.
Equipment and service providers both handle an
increasingly high level of customer complaints and customer service
calls based on spyware.
In software installation decisions, informed consent is a problem in
human-computer interaction, and specifically a problem in interface
and interaction design, that should not be left solely to the lawyers.
This paper first provides an overview of the legal, technical, and
design issues involved in helping users manage spyware that is
disclosed in EULAs. This overview leads to a discussion of the
possible "solution graphs" through which inappropriate spyware can
be avoided without preventing users from installing similar software
that they value. We then report on the results of a set of experiments
in which different installation and consent interfaces were used in an
attempt to improve user decision-making and discuss the implications
for both design and future research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINITION OF SPYWARE
A fundamental problem is the lack of a standard definition of
spyware. Two particularly contested issues are the range of software
behaviors that should be included in the definition and the degree of
user consent that is desirable.
First, some prefer a narrow definition that focuses on the
surveillance aspects of spyware and its ability to collect, store, and
communicate information about users and their behavior. Others use a
broad definition that includes adware (software that displays
advertising), toolbars, search tools, hijackers (software that redirects
web traffic or replaces web content with unexpected or unwanted
content), and dialers (programs that redirect a computer or a modem to
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dial a toll phone number). Definitions for spyware also include hacker
tools for remote access and administration, keylogging, and cracking
passwords.
Second, there is limited agreement on the legitimacy of software
that engages in behavior such as targeting advertisements and
installing programs on user machines that collect click stream data.
Users consider a wide range of programs that present spyware-like
functionality unacceptable. However, spyware-like functionality may
be acceptable, even desired, in some contexts but objectionable in
others (e.g., keylogging as a parental control tool v. keylogging
software installed on an adult’s private computer without consent). At
times the boundary between spyware and legitimate data collection or
advertising practice hinges on whether the user is a willing participant
in the activity. For example, some personalization features require
detailed monitoring of end user interaction with software and/or web
content. Where the functionality provided by the software is desired,
and the user has actively chosen to allow data to be collected and used
for the purpose of personalization, privacy grounds for intervening in
the transaction on behalf of the individual are some what diminished.
Although the effects of spyware on third parties and doubts about the
ability of end users to fully understand the consequences of their
decision to allow data collection (for example, a subpoena for their
search terms), may support legal intervention even where spyware
behavior is agreeable to the end user at the point of software
installation. The practice of bundling software, which merges spyware
with unrelated programs, heightens concerns with the ability of end
users to comprehend the ramifications of data collection and
advertising practices. Thus, providing another rationale for advocating
interventions in private decisions about software installation to protect
against externalities that weaken the security of the network overall,
and place economic burdens on third parties like service and
equipment providers.
In July 2005 the Anti-Spyware Coalition (ASC), a coalition of
anti-spyware software companies, academics, and consumer groups,
released a document establishing its definition of spyware. The ASC
defines spyware as:
Technologies deployed without appropriate user consent
and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over:
Material changes that affect their user experience, privacy,
or system security;
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Use of their system resources, including what programs are
installed on their computers; and/or
Collection, use, and distribution of their personal or other
sensitive information.1

This definition is quite broad including a wide range of software
behavior, and hinges in large part on the manner in which the software
impairs user control over their computer or engages in behavior
without “appropriate user consent.” The emergence of a consensus
definition is an important step in addressing spyware through
technological, market, and regulatory mechanisms.1 The question of
what indicates “appropriate user consent” to permit certain software
behaviors is addressed in a second document released in January 2006
by ASC.2 The ASC Risk Model Description document sets out a series
of factors, including notices and control options (opt-out/opt-in)
during installation among others, that ASC members consider when
determining whether a given piece of software is spyware.
Importantly, the document provides insight into the complicated,
multi-factor balancing that is conducted by these private companies in
determining whether to block, warn users, or allow a software
installation to occur.
B. LEGAL ISSUES
Spyware legislation is under consideration in twenty-seven U.S.
states and in the U.S. Congress. At least twelve states have enacted
spyware legislation. The proposals vary in their focus and scope,
ranging from restrictions or prohibitions on unsolicited
advertisements, to prohibitions on the unconsented to transmission of
personally identifiable information, to requirements that spyware
contain removal procedures, to demands on consumer protection
agencies to collect complaints. The diversity among state and federal
proposals reflects a diverse view of the problem, as well as the

1

Anti-Spyware Coalition, “Anti-Spyware Coalition Definition and Supporting Documents.”
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/definitions.htm.

2

Anti-Spyware Coalition, “Anti-Spyware Coalition Risk Model.”
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/RiskModelDescription.htm.
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influence of various parties who have supported and opposed spyware
legislation.
The spyware provisions that limit or prohibit the collection or
transmission of certain personal information without the individual
data subject’s consent are consistent with general principles of data
protection. Europe's data privacy and data protection laws, while not
spyware specific, embody this principle. In general, these laws require
that information be collected for a lawful and limited purpose, and that
individuals consent to the collection of their data, be informed of the
use, have the right to inspect and correct such data, and the right to
revoke consent in the future. The focus on informed consent in the
data protection context, resonates with the ASC’s focus on
“appropriate user consent” and extended consideration of factors that
may evince such consent in the Risk Modeling document.
In the absence of specific spyware statutes, spyware is governed
by existing laws governing contracts, fraud, and computer hacking.
An examination of the few U.S. cases that directly address spyware
shows that the courts place a strong emphasis on the existence of an
agreement with the user to install the software.3 For example, in
Federal Trade Commission v. Seismic Entertainment,4 the FTC
alleged that the Seismic’s software script exploited web browser
security vulnerabilities to download and install programs without the
computer user's knowledge or authorization. The surreptitiously
installed software then served ads promoting Seismic's anti-spyware
software. The court found the FTC likely to succeed in a case based on
unfair and deceptive acts and practices and granted a temporary
restraining order against Seismic.
Given the courts’ focus on consent, many spyware programs,
particularly those distributed through channels with legitimate
reputations, attempt to establish an agreement with the user through a
EULA. Software EULAs are governed by traditional contract law.
The formation of a legally enforceable agreement requires a concrete
offer by one party and clear acceptance of that offer by the second
party. Contracts are binding because they represent the parties’ mutual

3

New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer filed charges against Intermix Media for trespass,
false advertising, and deceptive business practices. Intermix distributed screensavers and
games bundled with spyware. These charges, which were settled before a court decision,
stemmed in part from misleading, inaccurate, or nonexistent EULAs.

4

FTC v. Seismic Entm't Prod’s, No. 04-377-JD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H.
October 21, 2004).
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assent to bargained-for terms. This meeting of the minds is central to
the legal justification for contract enforcement.
In the software EULA context, the traditional contract paradigm
faces difficulties. Most importantly, end users’ manifestations of
consent are often ambiguous. Some software is governed by terms
merely posted to the web page from which the software is
downloaded.5 These browsewrap agreements require no overt act
during installation on the part of the end user to demonstrate assent to
the EULA terms. Similarly, courts have enforced shrinkwrap
agreements that purport to bind users to EULA terms that appear on
software packaging simply because the user opened the package.6
Even clickwrap agreements, which require users to click the
ubiquitous “I Agree” button, pose problems. Often end users fail to
understand the purpose or legal significance of EULAs. And, of
course, many simply have become conditioned to view them as a
meaningless but necessary hurdle in the software installation process.
As a result, users often fail to read them. Even those that do read
EULAs often find the documents indecipherable because of their
length, the format in which they are displayed, and the use of
specialized technical and legal language.
If users read and understood the terms of software EULAs, many
would be surprised by the number of legal obligations they create. For
example, after just a few clicks, a user installing KaZaA agrees to
provisions that prohibit reverse engineering, altering registry keys,
disabling advertisements, and removing third party software. In
addition the user “assents” to no less than three "choice of law"
provisions and an arbitration clause. The user indemnifies the software
providers for any infringing transmissions and permits the sharing of
contact information and browsing history for the purposes of receiving
promotional emails and targeted advertisements. The software
companies disclaim any warranties and limit their liability for the
misuse of personal data or damage to the user’s computer. These
agreements claim to bind all subsequent users of the software,
regardless of their awareness of the EULA terms. While it is certainly
likely that some users would willingly agree to those terms in order to
use KaZaA, we strongly doubt that all users who clicked through the
KaZaA EULA would have a genuine "meeting of the minds." Indeed,

5

Specht v. AOL, 306 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2002).

6

Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. , 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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our results below show that some users regret installing programs like
KaZaA after being informed of the contents of the EULA.
Despite the problems EULAs present, courts typically enforce
them. Even in more traditional contract contexts, performance of an
act can serve as acceptance of a contract. In the EULA context, courts
typically find that installing or using the software is sufficient to
establish acceptance of EULA terms even when users are not required
to click “I Agree.”7 Further, the user’s failure to read a EULA rarely
mitigates against a conclusion of contract formation. When a
document is reasonably understood to create legal obligations, courts
impose a duty to read.8 This obligation to read extends not just to
EULAs but to documents hyperlinked from EULAs as well.9 And
while EULA language is far from clear, courts are reluctant to excuse
violations on the basis of confusing language.
At the same time, some courts have called into question whether
users have agreed to EULA terms. In Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC,10
the court refused to require arbitration, as specified in the EULA, by
finding that agreement to the EULA was itself a triable issue of fact.
Courts have great latitude in determining whether a contract is in
place. They may even refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts,
although they rarely do so. Part of the motivation for our research is
to provide objective data on whether users understand the nature of
their agreement and the terms to which they agree when installing
spyware which is disclosed in the software EULA.
C. TECHNICAL ISSUES
While a detailed discussion of technical approaches to addressing
spyware goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to review
the most common solutions in use and to discuss the limitations and
potential of these solutions. Dozens of spyware defense software
packages focus on scanning a computer to identify and remove
suspicious software, registry keys, and files. Others prevent software

7

See Tarra Zynda, Note, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving Minimum
Requirements of Contract on the Internet, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 495, 504-505 (2004).

8

Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989).

9

Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

10

Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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from making certain system changes (e.g., modifying registry keys or
the browser home page).
A smaller number of products protect against leaks of personal
information. For example, Norton Internet Security blocks
transmission of personal data via web forms, e-mail, instant
messenger, etc., without user knowledge or consent. More specific
tools such as eBay's toolbar protect against disclosure of particular
sorts of data, in this case eBay passwords.
Some argue that instead of designing better notices which
consumers will ignore, we should concentrate on designing better
technology because in the end, “users just want us to do it all for
them.” The argument is that users lack the skill, methods, or desire to
manage their computer and protect themselves from Spyware and are
therefore willing to relinquish this responsibility to a software program
or operating system, trusting technological means to handle this
effectively. Virus programs were unwanted hosts that were stowaways
on legitimate applications, often causing unwanted effects from the
benign (displaying short messages or poems like “elk Cloner”) to
damaging files on the infected host or coordinating massive DDOS
attacks on high traffic targets. The industry that sprang up to defeat
this threat had one mission, to successfully detect and eliminate these
stowaway programs and remove them from their infected applications.
The question is, why shouldn’t the same be done for Spyware? There
are many good reasons why this should happen. Spyware programs,
especially those that are more deceptive in nature, require experts to
understand their operation and removal. Experts also have the benefit
of larger resources and experience, and can make more informed
decisions on what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on much better data than
that available to most users.
Ignoring the technical complications with such an approach,
spyware has proven to be a much more complicated problem to
eradicate because its definition often turns on the level of user control
or “consent” over the software’s operation. A majority of computers
and most new computers come with some form of Anti-Spyware/AntiVirus tool, yet spyware remains a large problem.
First there is the issue of how exactly the Anti-Spyware programs
operate. Methods of detection, criteria for flagging, and underlying
motivations for detection, all present important questions.
There are many Anti-Spyware applications. Generally, they use
different detection schemes, different criteria, and even different
methods of flagging software. Because the specifics of an antispyware program’s operation is generally not public, there are some
who question the motivations of the anti-spyware vendors. Recently,
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companies such as Microsoft have come under fire for changing how
they flag certain programs. The argument is that because these criteria
are not standard and open, there is always a risk that companies may
choose what to flag and not to flag based not on customers’ best
interest, but that of the anti-spyware vendor. The ASC documents
described above in conjunction with the ASC “Vendor Dispute and
False Positive Resolution” document, provide some understanding of
how anti-spyware vendors make decisions about what software to
block or label and provide procedural protections to software vendors
who believe they have been unfairly dealt with.
In addition to suspicion from some consumer activists, antispyware companies also routinely come under fire from vendors that
they tag as spyware as well. Some vendors have even filed lawsuits,
and used other methods to push anti-spyware vendors to re-evaluate or
downgrade their products. While well defined criteria may help
alleviate this problem, the ultimate decision is up to the consumer. If
consumers are provided an adequate means of evaluating the criteria
for themselves, then the anti-spyware vendor has a much easier job
concentrating on removing items that are clearly bad, and passing the
hard, context dependent, decisions on software in the grey areas to
consumers themselves.
At present, there are two major weaknesses that prevent antispyware tools from forming a complete solution. First, the tools
themselves are incapable of catching or removing all known spyware
(let alone unknown spyware). Second, the tools are not (and perhaps
cannot be) sophisticated enough to understand a given user’s tradeoffs between privacy, system performance, security and the
functionality enabled by a product. While limiting the scope in which
the tool is deployed can limit the choices users will have to make
(corporate environment vs. consumer machine), even if the tool can
identify a potential privacy or security threat, it is necessary in many
cases to present that threat to the user for the final decision about
installation.
Currently, the burden of informing the users falls on the EULA.
For these reasons, in addition to good software tools and operating
system design, it is important that we consider what user interface
design methods in conjunction with what legal reforms could improve
the current state of software disclosures and ultimately improve an end
users ability to successfully manage their computer environment.
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D. PRIVACY ATTITUDES AND USER BEHAVIOR
Consumers often lack knowledge about risks and modes of
technical and legal protection [3]. For example, a recent AOL/NSCA
study showed that users are unaware of the amount of spyware
installed on their computers and its origin [5]. A related study on the
use of filesharing clients shows that users are often unaware that they
are sharing sensitive information with other users [23].
Users also differ in their level of privacy sensitivity. Westin [6]
found that consumers fall generally into one of three categories:
privacy fundamentalists, privacy pragmatists, and the marginally
concerned. Other research shows that the pragmatic group’s attitudes
differ towards the collection of personally identifying information and
information to create non-identifying user profiles [23] and can be
distinguished with respect to concern towards offline and online
identity [3]. Users also show great concern towards bundling practices
and the involvement of third parties in a transaction [3][12].
Experimental research demonstrates that user behavior does not
always align with stated privacy preferences [3][23]. Users are willing
to trade off their privacy and/or security for small monetary gains
(e.g., a free program) or product recommendations [3][23]. Moreover,
Acquisti and Grossklags [3] report evidence that users are more likely
to discount future privacy/security losses if presented with an
immediate discount on a product. Consumers may also accept offers
more often when benefits and costs are difficult to compare and
descriptions are provided in ambiguous and uncertain terms [4].
E. ONLINE PRIVACY NOTICES
EULAs, ToS, and some privacy policies present complex legal
information. Research shows, however, that complexity of notices
hampers users’ ability to understand such agreements. For example,
Jensen and Pott [15] studied a sample of 64 privacy policies from high
traffic and health care websites. They found that policies’ format,
location on the website and legal content severely limit users’ ability
to make informed decisions.
One attempt to improve users’ ability to make informed decisions
is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [23]. Under this
standard, websites’ policies are expressed in a predefined grammar
and vocabulary. Ackerman and Cranor [2] explored ways to provide
user assistance in negotiating privacy policies using semi-autonomous
agents to interact with P3P enabled sites. Another system [11]
encourages users to create several P3P-enabled identity profiles to
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address information usage patterns and privacy concerns for different
types of online interactions. However, [25] Vila et al. raise the
question of whether users will ever be bothered to believe or read
privacy policies at all. They claim that because the cost of lying in a
privacy policy is low, and that some of the privacy policies are not
trustworthy, users do not feel it is worth their time to read them or pay
attention to them at all. The fact that EULAs can change their terms at
will further reduce users incentive to pay attention to them.
F. MULTI-LAYERED NOTICES
Research on product labeling and hazard warnings (see, for
example, [21]) focuses on improving the efficiency of consumer
notification.11 This research has influenced the formulation of different
methods for presenting notice to the end user. For example,
researchers from the Center for Information Policy Leadership call for
statements in short, everyday language that are available in a common
easy-to-read format12. However, they also caution that legal
requirements require companies to provide complete notices that do
not fit this standard (see, for example, [1]). They propose a multilayered notice with a minimum of two notices that first provide a
summary at the top level, increasing detail at the lower layers, and the
complete, detailed notice as a final layer. The layering should include
a short notice (also called condensed notice or highlights) that
provides the most important information in a consistent format,
including the parties involved, contact information, and the type of
data collected, and the uses for which it is intended.
There is varying governmental support for layered notices. For
example, the European Union has taken concrete steps towards a

11
The debate over labeling and notice is also taking place in the area of Digital Rights
Management (DRM). DRM systems limit a consumer’s ability to share copyright protected
content through digital media software and hardware features. Users implicitly agree to these
limits when purchasing DRM equipped products. Some consumer advocates believe this kind
of implicit notice is not adequate to alert consumers to the reduced functionality of the product
they are purchasing. In 2003 Reps Boucher (D-VA), Lofgren (D-CA) and Brownback (R-KS)
introduced the Consumers, Schools and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act
which attempted to increase consumer DRM rights.
12

P3P clearly shares the same goals, however, with a somewhat complementary solution
process.
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layered notice model.13 In the United States, the Department of Health
and Human Services has encouraged entities covered by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to prepare such
notices [20]. In addition, currently proposed Spyware legislation asks
that companies provide notices in an easy to process format. However,
despite public consideration14, there is no broad consensus for the
financial industry pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [1].
G. HCI AND DESIGN ISSUES
Our research shows that software EULAs are not an effective
mechanism for conveying information to end users. Through
interfaces that, increase awareness of significant issues, we may create
greater potential for informed consent. However, HCI is only a partial
solution.
The challenge of attracting attention to important events is not a
new one in HCI. A number of researchers are studying the effects of
notification systems in computing. Examples of systems include
instant messaging, user status updates, email alerts, and news and
stock tickers. This research examines the nature of interruptions and
people’s cognitive responses to work-disruptive influences.
Notification systems commonly use visualization techniques to
increase information availability while limiting loss of users’ focus on
primary tasks [6][14][27]. From control room and cockpit indicators to
desktop notifiers, substantial research has been devoted to identifying
visual and auditory displays that attract attention and to designing
interaction sequences that prevent automatic dismissal of information.
As a trivial example, it is now somewhat common to prohibit the
use of an "Agree" button until after the user has viewed the entire
agreement. Of course, scrolling to the end of the agreement defeats
that simple intervention.

13

Article 29 Data Working Party, “Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions,”
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/eu/gruppe29/wp100/wp100_en.pdf. The Article 29
Data Protection Working Party is an independent advisory body set up under Article 29 of
Directive 95/46/EC, and it outlined this approach.

14

See Federal Trade Commission. Getting noticed: writing effective financial privacy
notices. http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/getnoticed.pdf. (notes from a public
workshop discussing how to provide effective notice under the GLB Act: Get Noticed:
Effective Financial Privacy Notices, (Dec. 4 2001)).
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If the particularly relevant terms or conditions of a EULA can be
identified, it is possible to summarize them in a short, easy-to-read
form. If standardized agreements are designed, it is possible to
highlight only unusual terms. For example, the European Union’s
approach to consumer protection in standard mass-market consumer
contracts, such as EULAs, pursues a mixture of standard terms and
construction presumptions against non-standard terms. Below we
experiment with interfaces that use such a design to determine how
effectively they can change user actions and user satisfaction with
their software installation decisions.
Given the variety of individual preferences, it may be necessary to
develop a profile of preferences (much like P3P for web-based
privacy) to alert users to cases where an agreement or a software
system may be traversing their usual preferences. The success of any
such notification system depends upon both the reliability with which
such determinations can be made and the number of false positives—
the number of alerts that the user chooses to dismiss rather than honor.
We have all become accustomed to web browser alerts (e.g., for
moving from a secure to insecure site) that are not sufficiently valued
and are therefore turned off.
In sum, user interface design alone will not afford end users with
adequate information and control over software behavior. While the
lessons of HCI can help inform the presentation of information to
users, the technical and legal underpinnings are essential to avoid
carefully presenting the user with little more than noise, or worse,
creating a “usable” privacy or security solution in which users can
simply, efficiently, and more knowingly undermine their privacy,
security, or other interests.
III. SOLUTION GRAPHS
We refer to the ideas in this section as solution graphs because
they flow from the analysis illustrated in figure 1. The goal of this
section is to identify a set of partial solutions, and to identify a set of
research questions that can help inform us as we pursue these
questions.
Spyware is not a clean category, but rather a fuzzy one.
Nonetheless, for some set of spyware, it may be that an authority
determines that it should be prohibited. That authority may be legal
(e.g., banning the transmission of Social Security numbers through
such software), or more likely organizational (e.g., a company
determining that any software in certain categories is banned). The
first solution graph, therefore, is a legal/technical one. If the authority
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is governmental, such software may be prohibited by law. Whether
governmental or organizational, such software may be prevented or
removed by anti-spyware tools. This solution bypasses the entire
question of informed consent by declaring that the user’s opinion of
the software is inconsequential.
If the software is not banned or blocked, then the decision of
whether to install it should be left to the user. One would hope for an
honest and accurate disclosure of the functioning of the software;
however the current state of consumer protection law creates perverse
incentives that can discourage disclosure. An inaccurate disclosure is
more likely to create liability than a lack of disclosure. Therefore
entities that provide more detailed notices and explicit promises to
consumers risk faces greater legal exposure for divergent practices
than those who remain silent. Today there is a lack of incentive to
provide complete and accurate disclosures. There is growing pressure
on spyware companies, particularly adware companies, to use EULAs
to describe software behavior. While these incentives may drive
legitimate businesses they are unlikely to influence the behavior of
truly egregious actors.
Unsurprisingly, given the state of EULAs, users may be skeptical
of company disclosures and turn to trusted third parties such as antispyware companies to assess the software’s behavior. One could
imagine a light weight service that served a Consumer Reports
function, rating or scoring software to summarize their assessment of
the risks and trade-offs involved in its installation and use.
Assuming, for purposes of this section, there is a full and accurate
disclosure, the next question is whether there is a meeting of the
minds—informed consent. As we show below and others have shown
before, EULAs are not well suited to provide information to users or
to aiding user comprehension. There exist several challenges to
informed consent: 1) the consent process appears as an obstacle on the
way to a task; 2) the length and language of documents used to convey
information to users; and 3) the triviality of the consent mechanisms
employed (“I agree”). Consider spyware installed with a game
downloaded from a web site. The user eager to play this game is
unlikely to break concentration from the task to give serious time and
consideration to the consequences, particularly if doing so requires
reading a multi page document containing dense legal and technical
language.
One solution to this dilemma would be to delay
gratification—if software installation did not take effect for some
period of time then users might have time to reconsider their actions.
This "cold shower" approach has been incorporated in law to protect
consumers in potentially high-pressure, high-stakes contexts (such as
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in-home sales). Early results in computer-based education show some
promise: when users were not allowed to respond immediately to
questions their answers improved.

Figure 1: Graph of possible solutions to spyware problem
Since most users are unlikely to agree to a waiting period before
software installation, the remaining choices are all about the user
interface. Here, there have been two directions. Persuasive
approaches have been used to elicit a predefined correct answer more
often. For example, warning people that untrusted software can
damage your computer attempts to elicit a "no" response. Informative
approaches can be measured on their effectiveness in getting users to
give the correct answer, whether that answer is "yes" or "no." Such
approaches may include summaries of terms, matches between terms
and profiles, and even a clear statement of costs and benefits.
We argue that the nature of spyware today requires the union of
these techniques. Realistically, individual informed consent is an
attention- and effort-intensive process. Individuals need the backup of
legal infrastructure to prohibit the most egregious offenses, to force
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the honest disclosure of terms and effects, and to protect them against
over-reaching and unconscionable terms. Technology can help
enforce preferences when they can be accurately expressed and their
violation detected. External agencies can help by providing ratings of
risk and quality. But in the end, users must have the control to make
certain decisions about trade-offs between their privacy, their security,
their attention, and the services or products they desire.
In the rest of this paper, we describe an experiment on different
notice conditions, describe the results, and explore a set of questions to
help us along the way towards an environment in which meaningful,
informed consent is more likely to be achieved.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We conducted a study in which participants were being observed
while they considered installing five real world applications. Our goal
was to examine the factors that contribute to users’ application choices
when those programs exhibit behaviors that can harm their
information privacy, computer security, and system performance. In
particular, we aimed to understand what impact currently implemented
and proposed warnings and notices have on users’ installation
decisions of potentially harmful software and their knowledge of
likely privacy and security consequences.
The goals of our investigation required us to study not only
quantitative data about installation frequencies but also qualitative data
about subjects’ impressions of the programs under consideration close
to decision time. We, therefore, opted for direct observation of each
individual followed by an in-depth interview process that also
included brief surveys on attitudes towards program behaviors and
individuals’ knowledge with respect to computer configuration tasks.
Alternative study designs would have allowed for collection of
different types of data.
One alternative design would be to record users’ actions on their
own machines over some period of time and ask users questions about
the types of programs they installed. However, this approach is errorprone, as it depends upon users correctly remembering and
commenting on their actions.
A long-term log or a one-time audit of user machines, as
conducted in the Earthlink spyware study [12], would have permitted
us to record the number of potentially harmful programs on users’
computers. However, it would not have provided a way to study
individuals’ behavior during the program selection and installation
process.

300

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

[Vol. 2:2

To gain a better understanding of users’ behavior, we needed to
observe the process and ask the users questions immediately after the
experiment was performed. While the trade-off of this approach is
fewer users than a survey or audit study, the advantages of the study
approach is that we were able to obtain sufficient data, observe all
interactions with the software, gather qualitative data about the
decision-making process during and after installation, and maintain
consistency across subjects.
A drawback of our approach is the small number of participants
that limits our ability to present statistically robust results. However,
we believe that our exploratory study helps to provide a good
overview of the multi-dimensional information gathering and choice
process of individuals that would not have been possible with a more
constrained study methodology. We suggest that our study provides
enough data to inform and guide our further experimentation into user
behavior and notice design.
A. EXPERIMENT CONSTRUCTION
1. APPLICATIONS USED IN THE EXPERIMENT
As part of our study, we selected five applications that users could
download. Each contained bundled software or functionality that
monitored user’s actions or displayed adds. The criteria we used in
selecting our programs were:
1. The program must have a legitimate and desirable function;
2. The program must have some type of bundled functionality
that could be averse to a given user’s privacy/security
preferences; and
3. Programs must display a notice of terms (EULA, ToS/ToU)
that aim to contractually bind the user upon installation.

We chose the following programs:
•

KaZaA – “A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that
allows you to share and download media files from
other users.”
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Edonkey – “A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that
allows you to share and download media files from
other users.”

•

Webshots – “This program provides a variety of
ways to use photos for your computer desktop as
wallpaper and screensavers.”

•

Weatherscope – “A program that displays your
current local temperature whenever you are online.
It provides one-click access to 3-day and 7-day
forecasts.”

•

Google Toolbar – “A program that allows you to
search the web from any web site, eliminate pop-up
ads and fill in forms with one click.”
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We wanted the programs to reflect the range of behavior and
functionalities that users encounter while installing applications in the
real world. We selected some programs that had explicit opt-out
options (e.g., Google Toolbar and Edonkey) and some that lacked such
options (e.g., KaZaA and Weatherscope). In addition, we included
programs that bundled multiple seemingly unrelated applications (e.g.,
KaZaA) and a program that likely does not bundle additional software
or functionality (e.g., Webshots).
During our selection process we aimed to include programs with
different brand reputation. For this reason, we chose a program from a
brand with a positive association, such as Google. Other programs in
our study received substantial negative press, such as KaZaA.
Importantly, while these applications include or bundle program
behaviors that may conflict with users’ privacy and security
preferences, we did not suggest to participants that any of them
contain spyware. Perception concerning each programs’ behaviors,
and disclosure and consent procedures often decide whether a program
is considered spyware or not, both by end users and by anti-spyware
vendors. Therefore, our research intentionally included software that
users would unlikely consider to be spyware or even intrusive (e.g.,
Google Toolbar).
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2. EXPERIMENT SCENARIO
In order to motivate our users to make a decision to install or not
install a given program, we created a scenario for users to follow. We
wanted to provide users with a reason to consider installing some or all
of the programs, but we also wanted to ensure that they were not
obligated to install any of them. We thus presented the user with the
following situational description:
Imagine that a friend (or relative) has asked you to help set up this
computer. The computer already has the most popular office
applications installed. Your friend wants additional functionality and
is considering installing other software.
Here is a quote from your friend: “Here are some programs that
were recommended to me by my friends. Since you know more about
computers than me, can you install the ones you think are
appropriate?”
The five program executables were located on the desktop of the
computer used by the participants. The displayed name of the
executables as well as the study instructions did not reveal the
programs’ brands or names. They were referred to as Program A, B, C,
D and E. Subjects, however, received basic descriptions of the
programs below the printed scenario description in the instructions.
For example, we described KaZaA and EDonkey as: “Program A (or
E) - A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that allows you to share and
download media files from other users.” For each study subject we
randomized the arrangement of the programs in the instructions and on
the desktop to avoid order effects.
If users decided to install a program, they could double click on
the program’s installation icon which started each program’s standard
installation routine. They could decide at any time to cancel the
installation and go on to the next program.
3. NOTICE CONDITIONS
We wished to examine whether different types of notices would
affect a user’s decision to install a program. We were also interested
in capturing if users were aware of each type of notice, and their recall
of the notice after installation. We chose three different types of
notices. Below we describe the characteristics of each notice
condition.
Notice Condition 1 - EULA Only: The first notice condition is a
control treatment consisting of only the original EULAs and notices
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that are included in each program. This notice condition represents
what most users would see when they install a program downloaded
from the internet.

Figure 2: EULA for Webshots
Notice Condition 2 - Microsoft SP2 Short Notice + EULA: In
addition to the EULA included in each individual program, the second
notice condition includes a short warning from Microsoft that is
displayed when users begin the installation. This warning is included
with Windows XP Service Pack 2, and is provided for all programs
that are downloaded from the web. If available, the notification
includes a link to the publisher information as well as links to privacy
policy information. The purpose of this notice condition is to test if a
commonplace heightened-notice practice, active by default, will affect
installation behavior.
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Figure 3: Microsoft Windows XP SP2 Warning
Notice Condition 3 - Customized Short Notice + EULA: The third
notice condition consists of a layered notice: a customized short notice
in addition to the EULA included in each individual program. In this
notice condition, the short Microsoft warnings shown in notice
condition 2 were disabled. Users were instead presented with a
window that provides specific information about each program (see
Figure 3). When users reached the portion of the installation program
that showed the EULA, this window appeared in the forefront of the
EULA automatically. We describe how we decided on the content and
presentation of these short notices in more detail below.
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Figure 4: WeatherScope Customized Short Notice
4. CREATING THE SHORT NOTICES
As noted above, there exists considerable legal and computer
security literature that deals with short notices. The actual content that
a short notice should contain is slightly different in each proposal, but
they all recommend that the most relevant information should be
presented clearly and concisely. The EU model suggests that the
condensed notice should contain all the relevant information to ensure
people are well-informed about their rights and choices.15 The key
points of a short notice are that they should use language and layout
that are easy to understand, and they should include:

15

Article 29 Data Working Party, “Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provision,”

http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/eu/gruppe29/wp100/wp100_en.pdf.
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•

The name of the company

•

The purpose of the data processing

•

The recipients or categories of recipients of the data

•

Whether replies to questions are obligatory or
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of
failure to reply

•

The possibility of transfer to third parties

•

The right to access, to rectify, and oppose

[Vol. 2:2

The purpose of our study is neither to create a new standard for
short notices, nor to evaluate the effectiveness of various language
terms. Rather, our goal is to determine if any short notice would have
an effect on a user’s installation decisions. For this reason, we chose
to emphasize the aspects of a EULA that were consistent with users’
expressed privacy/security preferences, such as items describing third
party access to information and the impact on machine performance
(slow down, crashing, popups, etc.). We borrowed heavily from
existing recommendations when appropriate, using a simple layout,
bullet points, and easy to understand language. We created a series of
four generic privacy/security questions, which we answered for each
program in the notice. An example short notice is shown in Figure 4.
We derived the content for each short notice by examining the
TOS and EULA for each program, and answered each of the four
questions described below using consistent language across notices.
Our aim was to include information that those skilled in the art would
know or be able to infer about the program by installing it.
We aimed to answer the following questions in a consistent
fashion across programs:
•

What information is collected? The purpose of
this question is to describe in common language
what information is being collected by the program.
This is in keeping with the proposals of the EU and
P3P notices.

•

How is this information collected? The purpose of
this question is to inform users how the information
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above will be collected by the program being
installed and all of its additional components.
•

How is this information used? The purpose of this
question is to provide information to users about
how the program and its additional components will
use the information collected (above). If information
is given to third-parties, such would be noted here.

•

How does this installation affect your computer?
Users are often concerned about system
performance issues that may arise when they are
installing new software. In many cases, this may be
the most important factor in deciding whether to
install a program. Measuring operating system
impact in relation to other programs the user may
have already installed and their current
configuration is non-trivial. Ideally, it would be nice
to say “the computer will be 25% slower” or “it will
take an extra couple of minutes to perform common
tasks,” yet the complexities and unknowns of
various configurations makes it difficult to do so.
We instead opted for an approach that would
educate users about the possible consequence of
installing additional programs. For this reason, we
chose to tell users the number of programs they were
installing, and that additional programs could cause
the computer to behave more unreliably and
possibly slower.

Information about uninstalling programs is also important to users.
However, we chose not to include this in our short descriptions since it
is difficult to articulate the degree of difficulty to remove a program,
and we lacked detailed technical information about each individual
program to determine what is actually removed by uninstalling the
program. However, we thought it would be valuable to capture user
capabilities in detecting and uninstalling software using common
Microsoft Windows tools. Therefore, we included related questions in
a post-installation survey. In future work, we will look more closely at
user behavior in the uninstall process.
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5. SURVEYS AND POST STUDY INTERVIEW
During the experimental phase we anticipated users to be
influenced by a multitude of individual preferences and strategies that
would contribute to their decisions to gather different degrees of
information about a program and finally to install or not to install a
program. For example, some participants might have a positive prior
experience with a program, while others are not interested in a
program’s functionality.
To gain greater insight into these
unobservable factors and the causes for users’ behaviors, we involved
each user into a post-experimental standardized open-ended interview
[18] with two nested one-page paper surveys. We created an interview
script with a set of carefully worded questions and transitions as well
as with a fixed ordering aimed to create a comparable experience for
all participants. We indicated opportunities for probing users’
responses and included certain suggestions for brief follow-up
questions in the script. For treatments 2 and 3, we added a brief
section to study the specific effects of these treatments but otherwise
kept the survey unchanged. We attempted to place this additional
section so that the perceived difference between the interviews would
be limited. The interviews were planned to last for an average of 45
minutes, and actually took between 35 and 60 minutes.
We structured the interview into the following sections:
1. Basic Demographic Information
2. Reasons for Install/Uninstall of each program
3. Ask for recommendations how they would change the
installation process to assist in decision making process
4. Prior Experience with Programs
5. Questions about Notice and Contractual Agreements
(Added specific questions about notice conditions 2 and 3)
6. First Survey on privacy preferences
7. Reaction to Short EULAs, determine if they regret the
decision to install/ not install
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8. Ask again for recommendations to installation process to
assist in their decision making process
9. Second survey on technical capabilities
10. General comments and feedback to our study

Section I included questions about participants’ age and computer
usage practices. Then, in section II, we studied participants’ reasons
that motivated them to install or not install each program. First, for
each program installed by the participant, we queried for her reasons
to act in this way, and followed up with a question asking whether she
had also considered any factors for not installing the program.
Second, we continued this section discussing programs that were not
installed by the participant reversing the order of these two questions.
In section III we asked whether any (unspecified) factors with respect
to the installation screens helped users in their choice to install or not,
succeeded by a generic question whether participants would
recommend any improvements to those screens to help them with their
installation decisions. By starting with these very basic questions, in
sections II and III, we aimed to derive a general understanding about
participants’ motivational drivers for their program choices before we
would involve them into a more focused dialogue on the notice
conditions. At this point, we expected that participants would more
likely refer to security concerns in conditions 2 and 3 compared to the
control condition 1.
Section IV investigated participants’ prior knowledge of each
program: did they hear of it; did they install it themselves; and did
they actually use it. Next, in section V, we investigated whether
participants were aware that by installing a program they entered into
a contractual agreement with the software producer, whether they
remembered anything about those agreements, and whether this
information had any impact on their installation decisions. At this
point we also inserted questions about notice conditions 2 and 3.
Then, in section VI, we presented participants with a paper survey
that listed sixteen program features: some being likely undesirable and
commonly associated with spyware, and others that we considered as
potentially beneficial. Participants indicated their level of concern with
those features on a 5-point Likert Scale (with 1: ‘not concerned;’ 5:
‘extremely concerned’). In section VII, we asked participants to study
the short notices for each program. We requested participants to
revisit their earlier choices to install or not install each program, and
what information in the short notices could contribute to change their
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mind or not.16 We anticipated participants to show different types of
reaction (e.g., regret or confirmation of their earlier decisions)
depending on, for example, their prior knowledge of the program and
their attitudes towards the features listed in the short notices.
Subsequently, in section VIII, we asked participants to reconsider
whether they would desire any changes to the installation process of
the programs provided. We note that sections II-III and VII-VIII are
not redundant for notice condition 3, since we could not foresee how
each participant would react to the short notices during the experiment
(e.g., some would study them carefully, while others would ignore
them).
In section IX participants were asked to indicate their level of
comfort and prior experience with thirteen computer maintenance
practices commonly connected to defending against, and removing
spyware (e.g., configuring a firewall and editing the Windows
registry). The survey format facilitated a response on a 4-point scale
(ranging from ‘not comfortable at all’ to 'have done this many times;’
we also gave participants the option to indicate that they are ‘unsure’).
We concluded in section X by asking for general comments about our
study.
We should note that the purpose of the nested surveys was not to
create broad generalizations of the computing public at large. There
have been many other surveys that have provided excellent data on
users’ privacy and security preferences. Rather, our surveys were
included to get a better understanding of our subjects’ capabilities and
concerns, and to use this information to guide our questions and
analysis, as well as to tie back our results to the larger research
community.
V. RESULTS
A. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Our user sample consisted of 31 participants: 14 male and 17
female university undergraduates assembled by a university recruiting
service. All used the Windows operating system on their home
computer, and 24 of them maintained their computer at home

16
For participants that experienced notice condition 3 we mainly expected confirmation of
their earlier choices. However, at this point we could study which of the practices in the short
notices were considered harmful or unproblematic.
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themselves. 14 participants had an age of under 20, 16 were aged
between 20 and 25. They spent an average of 26 hours a week on their
home computer (std. dev. of 12), and 2.5 hours a week on work
computers (std. dev. of 4).
B. SURVEY RESULTS
The tables below describe the results of the two surveys we
administered to each user. Table 1a describes the survey we gave to
users before the task, which concentrated on user concerns. Table 1b
describes the survey we gave to users after they performed the tasks,
which concentrated on users capabilities. From the survey results in
Table 1a, we saw that our users were mostly concerned with programs
that gave pop-up advertising, sent personal information, or affected
their systems performance (crashing, slowing down, etc). Our users
seemed least concerned about monitoring behavior that the program
would use to provide updates or assist in diagnostics of software
problems. Finally, our users indicated that they were mildly concerned
about monitoring their actions on their machines, such as web sites
visited and programs installed.
In terms of their capabilities, our users represented more
sophisticated computer users. While this was most likely the result of
the sample we had (late teen, college undergraduates who spent on
average 26 hours per week on their home machines). It was surprising
how sophisticated they were since none of the sample were actually
pursuing a technical degree. To some extent, they represented the
growing sophistication of the average young computer user. Half of
the users had changed the value of a registry key at least once, or
could determine the amount of RAM an application was using as well
as the amount of CPU time an application consumed. In the postinterviews we confirmed that they had indeed learned many of these
techniques from more technical friends in an effort to combat spyware,
and determine what could be affecting their machine’s performance.
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1 - not 2 - minimally 3 - moderately 4 - very 5 - extremely
concerned concerned
concerned
concerned concerned

Questions
This program collects the title and web address of the websites
you visit.
This program collects information about what software is
present on your computer.
This program collects your first name, city, ZIP code, country
and time zone.
This program collects information about when the program
crashes and this information is reported to the company to
prevent crashes from happening in the future.
The information is collected whenever you use your web
browser to build a profile of your browsing behavior.
The information collected is used to display advertising on your
computer.
This program keeps track of your computer memory usage and
makes an automatic backup of your data if your computer is
likely to crash.
The information collected is used to create general statistics,
not linked to your identity.
The information collected is used to create a profile linked to
your identity.

Mean

Median Mode STDDEV

10%

23%

29%

32%

6%

3.03

3

4

3%

23%

32%

29%

13%

3.26

3

3

1.11
1.06

3%

3%

19%

29%

45%

4.10

4

5

1.04

52%

23%

16%

3%

6%

1.90

1

1

1.19

6%

19%

35%

16%

23%

3.29

3

3

1.22

3%

13%

6%

29%

48%

4.06

4

5

1.18

1.25

32%

26%

29%

3%

10%

2.32

2

1

35%

48%

10%

6%

0%

1.87

2

2

0.85

0%

0%

16%

35%

48%

4.32

4

5

0.75

This program will cause your computer to slow down.

0%

3%

16%

19%

61%

4.39

5

5

0.88

This program will cause your computer to crash.
This program will prompt you to install updates to the program
when they are available.

0%

0%

0%

3%

97%

4.97

5

5

0.18

35%

32%

26%

3%

3%

2.06

2

1

1.03

13%

19%

35%

23%

10%

2.97

3

3

1.17

This program updates itself automatically and without notice.
This program will automatically add other programs to your
computer without asking you.
This program can be un-installed using the add/remove
programs feature that comes with Windows.
This program can only be un-installed manually.

0%

0%

0%

23%

77%

4.77

5

5

0.43

65%
29%

6%
23%

13%
16%

10%
13%

6%
19%

1.87
2.71

1
2

1
1

1.34
1.51

Table 1a: Survey Results of User Concerns

3 - I have never
4 - I’m not
1 - I have
2 - I have
done this but
comfortable and
done this
done this at
would be
would ask
many times least once comfortable trying someone to help 5 - Not sure

Questions

Mean

Median Mode STDDEV

Changing the value of a registry key

43%

7%

3%

17%

30%

2.83

2.50

1.00

1.80

Creating backups of your files

20%

20%

40%

20%

0%

2.60

3.00

3.00

1.04

Configuring an anti-virus program

30%

13%

23%

33%

0%

2.60

3.00

4.00

1.25

Configuring a firewall program

30%

17%

17%

37%

0%

2.60

3.00

4.00

1.28

Reinstalling the operating system

40%

17%

13%

23%

7%

2.40

2.00

1.00

1.40

Configuring security settings on your internet browser

30%

13%

23%

33%

0%

2.60

3.00

4.00

1.25

Remove programs from your computer

50%

0%

0%

50%

0%

2.50

2.50

4.00

Determining what tasks are running on your computer

40%

3%

10%

47%

0%

2.63

3.00

4.00

1.43

Finding files on your computer using windows explorer

23%

17%

13%

43%

0%

2.70

3.00

4.00

1.34

Determining what programs are installed on your computer

33%

10%

10%

43%

0%

2.57

3.00

4.00

1.43

Changing attributes of files and folder

20%

17%

10%

37%

13%

2.97

3.50

4.00

1.50

Determining how much RAM your computer is using

40%

10%

27%

20%

3%

2.37

2.50

1.00

1.30

Determining how much processor time an application is using

30%

20%

27%

13%

10%

2.53

2.50

1.00

1.33

1.53

Table 1b: Survey Results of User Capabilities
C. INSTALLATION DECISIONS
1. WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO PARTICIPANTS’ DECISION TO
INSTALL PROGRAMS?
One of the goals of our study was to observe user behavior
installing programs in a near-natural setting. It allowed us to ask
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questions about their motivations and actions. We observed whether
users paid attention to EULAs, and if so, what particular information
they obtained or sought. Other factors we examined are why
participants installed programs, and what process they followed. We
discovered that our participants shared general concerns about what is
installed and the effect it has on their computer. Participants varied
widely in their installation procedures.
2. INSTALL PROCESS
Participants’ reasons for installing programs varied. Some
participants only installed applications that they felt comfortable with.
Other participants installed everything with the intention of checking
out unknown programs and uninstalling them later. The following
categories demonstrate some of the main strategies we observed (we
note that we do not consider this to be an exhaustive list of all possible
user motivations or to be representative of the general population):
•

Install first, ask questions later: These participants
generally installed all programs at once, with the
intention of examining them in greater detail later.
They tended to consider themselves computer savvy,
with the ability to remove or configure programs
after installation to avoid adverse affects to their
machine. They felt sufficiently familiar with the
installation process and tended to click through each
screen very quickly.

•

Once Bitten, Twice Shy: These participants were
somewhat computer savvy, but they were influenced
by past negative experiences. One participant had
recently been a victim of a phishing attack, while
another had a program “totally cripple” her laptop.
They have had past computers crash or become
inoperable because of rogue programs or viruses and
often lost data These users tended to be overly
cautious, and they chose to install applications only
if they felt those applications were absolutely
required. They typically skimmed EULAs and
programs’ information for key phrases such as
“ads,” “GAIN,” or “popups” to avoid choices that
would potentially be harmful.
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•

Curious, feature-based: These participants were
primarily interested in potentially new and
interesting features delivered by the selection of
programs. They would only install an application if
it was popular or offered something that they would
want or need. These users would typically install a
program such as WeatherScope because they
thought it was “cool” and “useful”.

•

Computer-Phobic: These participants were
generally wary of anything that had to do with
installing programs or configuring a computer. They
sought assistance from their friends or other experts
when they had problems, and they would generally
request help with any install. One participant
mentioned that her father was a savvy computer user
and “passed on paranoia” to her. They were
generally very concerned with any warning that
popped up, and were reluctant to install anything.

3. INSTALLATION CONCERNS
1. Our participants shared a range of common concerns about
installing software that we gathered in our post-installation
interview sessions. In the interviews, we asked open-ended
questions about their concerns with each application. We
categorized these, and listed them below in order of
importance:
2. Functionality (>80%) – A large majority of participants who
expressed some form of concern were primarily interested in
the functionality of the application. By functionality, they
mean convenience, lack of other alternatives, its “cool
factor” (direct quote) and its purpose. Participants were most
interested in programs that are “necessary,” “helpful,” or
“convenient, easy to use” and would add some “aesthetics.”
3. Popups (~60%) – Popup advertising was the second largest
concern out of our participants, across all categories of users.
Many users had strong reactions to them. “I hate them!”
was a reaction echoed by several participants. Many were
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extremely reluctant to install a program that had popup
advertising or seemed like it would. One participant stopped
an installation after she saw the word “GAIN,” which
reminded her of Gator, a company that had put advertising
on her machine before.
4. Crashing their machine, computer performance (~30%) –
Some participants were worried that programs would crash
their machine, take up space, or cause their machine to be
unstable. This was especially a concern with the ‘Once
Bitten, Twice Shy’ participants.
5. Installing additional software (~15%) – Participants were
concerned about software that installed additional programs.
“I don’t want a lot of junk on my computer” remarked one
user. “Junk” was classified as additional programs that ran
in the background, that changed homepages, slowed the
machine, caused it to crash and/or served ads.
6. Monetary cost (~10%) – Some users were concerned that
they may be eventually charged later for software they
installed, even though they did not enter any credit card
information.
7. Sends information (<5%) – Our participants never directly
mentioned privacy concerns as a reason to not install a
program, but several mentioned that they would be wary of
programs that collected personal information because they
thought it would lead to spam or more ads on their machine.
They referred to personally identifiable information such as
email addresses.

4. WHAT DID USERS INSTALL?
We were interested what effect notice had on users installing
programs. As discussed above, we ran three notice conditions on 31
subjects. We observed their behavior and asked them questions about
their actions. A breakdown of subjects is included in Table 2.

316

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Control (EULA Only)
Generic Microsoft + EULA
Short Notice + EULA
Total

[Vol. 2:2

Number of Subjects
10
10
11
31

Table 2: Breakdown of subjects by notice condition
Table 2 indicates that additional notice overall (in the form of the
generic Microsoft warning or the short notice) had only a marginal
impact on the total number of installations (by ~10%, n.s.).However,
the post-interview process showed that participants felt better
informed in the notice condition 3 (short notice). In the following we
describe in more detail their reactions to notice condition 2 (generic
Microsoft notice) and notice condition 3 (short notice).

Control (EULA only)
Generic Microsoft +
EULA
Short Notice + EULA

Installs by notice
condition
36 (72%)
31 (62%)
35 (63%)

Table 3: Total Installs for per notice condition
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condition

Generic
Short EULA
Total
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Participants
who
remembered
seeing an
additional
notice
6 of 10
11 of 11
17 of 21

Participants
who
remembered
the content of
the additional
notice
8 of 10
10 of 11
18 of 21
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Participants
for whom the
notice affected
their decision
to install
4 of 10
7 of 11
11 of 21

Table 4: Number of participants that could remember additional
notices
5. GENERIC MICROSOFT NOTICE + EULA
Table 4 reproduces the number of participants that could
remember seeing the generic Microsoft notice (60%), that could
remember some content of the notice (80% with additional probing)
and remember that it had some effect on their decision to install
(40%). Some participants found the generic notices to be useful;
particularly if the generic warning indicated to users that there was no
known publisher. One participant stated “Edonkey didn’t look good.
The notice said ‘unknown publisher’, so I chose not to install it.”
However, none of the participants clicked on the link that provided
more information about the publisher if the publisher’s identity was
known. Several users instinctively clicked through the notices without
even reading them. When asked if they saw them, they said no, but
when prompted with a blurred version of the notice they said, for
example, that they have seen similar notices in the past. One
participant mentioned that “it asked you whether or not you wanted to
download it, [and] gave the company name, info and licensing agent.”
6. SHORT NOTICE + EULA
Table 4 shows that all participants could remember having seen the
short notice, and that 91% could remember some details of their
content. 64% stated that the short notice influenced their decision to
install the programs. Participants were generally enthusiastic about the
short notices we created. One user wanted to know where we got it,
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because he wanted to use it at home. Others remarked that they “were
amazing,” and that they would “love to see this, it would be really
awesome!” When further prompted for reasons to use this kind of
short notices, this participant remarked “I personally wonder how
many people just install stuff [without thinking], wouldn’t be surprised
if it was the majority.” Others stated that they used the information in
the short notices to compare programs and assist their decision. One
user said “the pop-up windows said the programs were no good, [and
I] might not have known without them.”
Most participants were able to recall parts of the content of the
short notices as well. They mostly recalled the issues that they were
most concerned about (e.g., pop-ups and system performance). Several
users were concerned about information transfers to third-parties, and
some mentioned that the information in the short notices “surprised
them.”
Despite the positive reactions, some users simply ignored them as
well. Despite stating in the post-interview that they would like “clear
and concise” information, they made comments such as, “It is hard to
say if I would read them [short EULAs] even if you flashed
IMPORTANT at the top. After the third or fourth one I wouldn’t read
and it would be easy to skip.”
7. WHAT PROGRAMS WERE INSTALLED MOST?
For each notice condition we were also interested in what
programs users installed. We saw that the Google Toolbar was the
most often installed among all sets, whereas Weatherscope ranked last.
Main reasons for this effect were brand recognition and prior
experience. Users mentioned, for example, that Google “was a trusted
brand name” and that they “thought Google toolbar did a good job at
blocking popups.”
While overall the difference in installations between notice
conditions was not statistically significant, there was a significant
difference in installations for Edonkey. Users remarked that Edonkey
was generally unfamiliar, so any additional notice “spooked” them. In
addition, as we will discuss in more detail later, in the case where
users had notices they used these in some cases to compare between
the two file sharing applications.
Weatherscope was rarely installed because it reminded users of a
similar program called “Weatherbug,” which was universally disliked
because “it had too many popups” and it “crashed my machine.” Users
also mentioned that the benefits that are associated with programs such
as Weatherscope or Weatherbug did not outweigh the higher cost of
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dealing with popup advertisements. A user remarked “you can go to
weather.com if you really want to check the weather, and then you
don’t have to deal with any popups.”
Installation by Treatment
Control (EULA Only)

Generic + EULA

Short + EULA

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Kazaa

Edonkey*
(p<.05)

Webshots

Weather
Scope

Google

Control (EULA Only)

30%

90%

90%

60%

90%

Generic + EULA

70%

30%

70%

50%

90%

Short + EULA

55%

45%

91%

27%

100%

Figure 5: Graph of Installation by Treatment
D. NOTICE TREATMENTS
1. DID USERS LOOK AT EULAS?
Participants generally ignored EULAs. The install first users were
especially adept at clicking through installation screens extremely
quickly. Some users went through this process so quickly that they
did not even remember clicking through the short notices and the
Microsoft warnings as they popped up. One install-first participant
remarked that “[t]he process is so standard, there is nothing to
influence [your decision] to install or not. I just use all the default
options and configure it later if I am going to keep it.”
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2. NOTICING NOTICE
We categorized whether users had read a notice as not at all,
skimmed and carefully. Not at all meant that they did not glance at the
notice and promptly continued to the next screen. Skimmed means that
they may have passed their mouse over the EULA looking for
keywords, or used the scrollbar to quickly browse through the
contents. Carefully means that they actually read some sentences or a
paragraph, before continuing on. We should note that in no case did
the users attempt to read through all of the EULAs or even one EULA
completely. In the case of the Generic Notices, because there was no
scrolling involved, we only noted if they had read it at all. Cases were
labeled as N/A if they were not relative to the installation. For
example, if users quit before they were able to see any notice, or
decided that they didn’t want to install a program, or the program did
not contain that feature, they were all marked as N/A and was not
included in the computation.

P ro g ra m

T o ta ls
A v erag e

C o n tro l
(E U L A o n ly)

E U LA +
G en eric
N o tice

E U LA +
S h o rt N o tic e

3 8 .1 0 %

5 0 .0 0 %

2 5 .5 8 %

R ea d E U L A
S k im m ed

3 7 .8 9 %

C a refu lly

1 0 .0 3 %

7 .1 4 %

6 .6 7 %

1 6 .2 8 %

N o t A t A ll

5 2 .0 8 %

5 4 .7 6 %

4 3 .3 3 %

5 8 .1 4 %

R ea d S h o rt
E U LA
S k im m ed

1 7 .0 7 %

1 7 .0 7 %

C a refu lly

6 0 .9 8 %

6 0 .9 8 %

N o t A t A ll

2 1 .9 5 %

2 1 .9 5 %

R ea d G en eric
N o tice
R ea d

4 1 .0 3 %

4 1 .0 3 %

N o t A t A ll

5 8 .9 7 %

5 8 .9 7 %

Table 5
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Table 5 shows that the Short Notices were skimmed or carefully
looked at almost 80% of the time, whereas the standard EULA and
Generic notice were looked at on average of less than 50% of the time.
3. WHEN DID USERS STOP AN INSTALLATION?
In addition to data on whether users had read or skimmed an
article, for 28 of the 31 users we had observational data about their
actions during the installation process. This data was gathered by
observing the installation process, and marking when users decided to
stop an installation. From the graph in Figure 6 and the data in Table
6, it is apparent that the majority of the users in all treatments would
complete an installation after they had started it. The most common
case for not installing an application was either skipping it entirely or
just opening it briefly before exiting (~15%). Once a user had decided
to install an application, it was very rare that they would stop. Less
than 6% total stopped installation at the EULA. In the treatments with
the short or generic notices, users aborted an installation only 10% of
the time.
EULA + EULA +
Installation Process for 28 of the Control
31 users
Short
Generic
(EULA only)
Notice
Notice
Didn’t Open and Ignored
8.00%
2.50%
10.00%
Opened Briefly then Stopped

8.00%

7.50%

4.00%

Stopped Before the EULA

0.00%

2.50%

2.00%

Stopped at the EULA

8.00%

2.50%

6.00%

Stopped at Short Notice

N/A

N/A

10.00%

Stopped at Generic Notice

N/A

10.00%

N/A

Stopped after EULA

6.00%

0.00%

0.00%

Completed Install

70.00%

75.00%

68.00%

Total

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Table 6

Total
7.14%
6.43%
1.43%
5.71%
N/A
N/A
2.14%
70.71%
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Installation Process
(28 users)
Control

EULA + Generic Notice

EULA + Short Notice
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Figure 6
4. FILESHARING AS A “MUST-HAVE” APPLICATION
We discovered that among our user population and demographic,
filesharing was a “must-have” application. Although users typically
installed only one filesharing application, 23 of the 31 users felt that
they should have at least one filesharing application. Users mentioned
that filesharing applications were “very useful” and something that
“everyone should have.” However, in choosing the filesharing
application to install, users frequently tried to determine which
application would be less intrusive on their machine. Some users used
the short notices to compare filesharing applications, while others
were influenced by the fact that one was “trusted” (as indicated in the
generic Microsoft warnings for KaZaA) and the other was “unknown”
(and therefore less trustworthy). Overall, more users installed eDonkey
over KaZaA. The primary reason for this decision was a negative
experience with KaZaA. For example one user complained that “it
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crashed my machine,” “I had to reinstall everything again,” and that
“it had too many popups.”
Notice condition
Control

Didn’t install one
Filesharing program
1

(EULA Only)
Generic + EULA

2

Short notice + EULA

4

Total

7

Table 7: Users who didn't install a Filesharing Application
5. VAGUE SHORT NOTICES CAN CREATE A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY
An interesting find was the higher number of installations for
KaZaA in the short notice treatment as compared to the control.
During the post-study interview participants indicated that KaZaA
“didn’t seem as bad” as Edonkey. The number of users preferring
KaZaA over Edonkey was especially pronounced in the short notice
treatment. As discussed above, users typically wanted to install one or
the other, and used the short notices to compare the programs.
Edonkey disclosed more about the software’s functionality, and gave
users the option to opt-out of certain features, and KaZaA did not.
The short notices that were constructed based on each programs
disclosure reflected this difference. Our short notice treatment
reflected the relative complexity of the two programs. Despite the fact
that the Edonkey EULA was more friendly to users—disclosing more
about program functionality and providing users with opportunities to
reject certain features—the greater complexity was evident in the short
notice and was viewed by users as unfavorable. Below we list the
contents of the eDonkey short notice and the KaZaA short notice.
From the two short notices below, we can see that eDonkey discloses
more information about what personal information is being collected,
but that the users have the ability to opt out of this process. KaZaA
says less about the type of information being collected and does not
offer an opt out. In this case, providing vague information, which led
us to create a simpler short notice, created an impression of increased
security or at least less risk
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6. KAZAA AND EDONKEY SHORT NOTICES
Below we list the actual short notices used to describe each program.
How the eDonkey Agreement Affects You and Your Computer
What information is collected?
•

Personally identifiable information like your name.

•

Information about your browser, computer operating
system and Internet Service Provider.

•

The title and web address of the websites you visit.

•

Information you enter into forms on websites and
what you clicked on.

How is this information collected?
•

Information is collected whenever you use your web
browser (Internet Explorer), whether or not you are
using eDonkey.

How is this information used?
•

The information collected is sent to third parties.

•

The information collected is used to display pop-up
advertising on your computer.

•

The information collected is used to create general
statistics about all users of the system.

How does this installation affect your computer?
•

You are installing four programs. Every time you
install a new program it has the potential to slow
down your computer, slow down your web
browsing, and/or cause other programs to crash.
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•

This program will show popup advertising on your
machine when you browse the web.

•

This program will automatically add new programs
to your computer without asking you.

•

This program will install a new toolbar in your web
browser, and change your browser start page.

How KaZaA Agreement Affects You and Your Computer
What information is collected?
•

The title and web address of the websites you visit.

How is this information collected?
•

Information is collected whenever you use your web
browser (Internet Explorer) whether or not you are
using KaZaA.

How is this information used?
•

The information collected is sent to third parties.

•

The information collected is used to display pop-up
advertising on your computer.

•

The information collected is used to create general
statistics about all users of the system.

How does this installation affect your computer?
•

You are installing four programs. Every time you
install a new program it has the potential to slow
down your computer, slow down your web
browsing, and/or cause other programs to crash.

•

This program will show popup advertising when you
browse the web, whether or not you are using
KaZaA at that time.

325

326

I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

•

This program will automatically add new programs
to your computer without asking you.

•

This program will install a new toolbar in your web
browser, and change your browser start page.
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7. EULAS AND TOS AS LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENTS
Our participants were generally ambivalent towards the EULAs
and ToS in the software they installed. Table 8 shows that while
almost all participants were aware that they were agreeing to a set of
terms by installing the software (30 of 31), they were generally unable
to recall the content of the agreement (only 8 of 31 recalled the
content), and it rarely influenced their decision to install a program
(only 6 of 31 mentioned that it influenced them). The participants
who did recall contents of the EULA remarked that it was generally
about information that referred to the software product itself, such as
“copyright notices,” “company policies,” or “reverse engineering the
product or using it for unintended purposes.” Almost none of the
participants, including the more computer savvy “[i]nstall first, ask
questions later” users, had any idea that the content of the EULAs and
ToS actually discussed applications that would be installed, data that
would be collected, and companies that would access their data. There
seems to be a disconnect between user expectations of EULA content
and actual EULA content. One user summed up this confusion by
stating “They should have notices to show what they are really
installing on the computer. They trick you [into] thinking it is just a
license agreement, [you] hit OK, and then you get an advertising bar
or a lot of junk!”
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Notice
condition

Control
(EULA only)
Generic +
EULA
Short
+ EULA
Total

327

Participants
aware that
the Software
EULA was a
contract
10 of 10

Participants
who had an
idea of what the
agreement
contained
2 of 10

Participants for
whom the EULA
affected their
decision to install

10 of 10

5 of 10

2 of 10

10 of 11

1 of 11

1 of 11

30 of 31

8 of 31

6 of 31

3 of 10

Table 8: Understanding EULAs as Contracts
E. REGRETTING INSTALLATION DECISIONS
We were interested to learn whether accurate information about
software behavior would lead users to change their mind about
program installations. We showed the short notices to all users at the
end of the survey to determine whether users read them earlier (this
applies to the short notice condition only) and if they thought they
would have influenced their installation decisions (applies to all notice
conditions). Users were asked to read each of the short notices
carefully, and to decide whether they would like to reverse their earlier
decision to install or not to install. This approach allowed us to gauge
whether individuals regretted their installation decision. Regret or
disappointment materializes if an earlier decision appears to be flawed
in retrospect, and/or when the obtained result does not match prior
expectations [17].
We were interested in examining the relationship between users
reading or skimming a Short Notice, EULA or Generic warning and
regret and installation decisions. We broke down possible types of
regret into these categories:
1. Users regretted their decision and would uninstall the
program.
2. Users regretted their decisions and would install the
program.
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3. Users did not regret their decision and would keep the
program installed.
4. Users did not regret their decisions and would keep the
program uninstalled.

While it is helpful to look at regret in these terms, we were
interested in the effect of notice alone, and in coordination with other
factors, on regret. Therefore we decided to look at the following
additional factors:
1. Previous Experience – Users were asked if they had
previously heard of an application, and if so, whether this
had influenced their choice to install the program.
2. Reading a notice – During the installation process, the
observer recorded whether users had looked at a notice or
not.
3. Influence of a notice – After the installation process, users
were asked if the notice influenced their decision or not.
4. Stopping an installation – During the installation process, the
observer noted at what point a user would stop installing a
given application.
5. Reasons for installing/not installing – Users were asked after
completing the installation, their reasons for installing or not
installing a given program.

Overall, we found that regret was highest with Weatherscope and
the filesharing programs. Users were generally happier with their
decision to not install these programs after reading our short EULAs.
Popups, performance issues, and the potential disclosure of private
information to third parties all contributed to user regret. Some users
were upset, stating “I didn’t install that!,” while others were surprised
at the extent of information collection they had agreed to by installing
and using certain programs. Some users remarked that they would
remove programs that had popups. They stated, “if I had known this
had popups I wouldn’t have installed it.”
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1. REGRET WITH FILESHARING APPLICATIONS
Despite the regret that some users felt for filesharing programs,
many indicated that they would still install them. One user who
expressed regret at her decision to install eDonkey said “if all free
music programs do this, and I can’t find anything better then I’m
going to install it. For a free photo program it might not be worth it,
but for free music it is.” Another user added “I really don’t like that it
adds other software, but I would still keep it because filesharing is
worth it.”
2. REGRET WITH TRUSTED SOURCES
In the case of Google Toolbar, the program with the greatest brand
recognition among our users, the reasons for uninstalling were related
to performance and space issues, rather than concerns with privacy or
computer security issues. One user indicated that he “didn’t want
another thing in [his] browser window” and that [he] liked to keep the
minimum amount of programs running at any given time.
3. REGRET ACROSS NOTICE CONDITIONS
We studied the degree of participant regret over an installation
decision in relation to each notice condition. We expected that users
would experience less regret when they were better informed (i.e.,
being presented a short notice or a generic Microsoft notice in addition
to the EULA). In fact, participants verbally indicated that especially
the short notices had a substantial effect on their decision to install or
not. Compared to the control notice condition, participants
experienced regret about 15% less often when presented with either a
short notice or a generic Microsoft warning. Given the size of the
study, this effect is not statistically significant; however, we believe it
merits future consideration.
The set of programs in our study included two applications that the
community of our participants had experienced high regret and low
regret with. We determined that there were some applications that had
a high install rate, low regret rate and were generally positively
commented upon (e.g., Google). Conversely, there were some
applications that were installed less frequently, had a higher level of
regret, and were viewed negatively. The applications with low regret
were Google and Webshots, and those with higher regret were
Edonkey and Weatherscope. We divided the applications into two
groups, and examined user regret across each notice condition. Table
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9 shows the percent of programs that users regretted versus those that
they would keep. The total number of programs removed was the net
of programs that users regretted installing and programs the user
regretted not installing. This number was then subtracted from the
total number of installs, and normalized across all programs and
treatments. From the graph in Figure 7, we can see that regret was
generally highest in the EULA treatment, and lower and about the
same for the generic notice and short notice treatment.
Google toolbar was the highest trusted application, with 93% of
users installing it, and 83% of the people deciding to keep it after
reading the short notice in the post-study interview. Weatherscope
was on the other end of the spectrum, with just 47% of the recipients
choosing to install it overall, and none of the thirty-one users choosing
to keep it.
Figure 7 gives a detailed breakdown of each program installed, and
illustrates the balance between programs that our users decided to
keep, and those they decided to remove. The top half of each bar
represents the percentage of users who chose to remove the program
while the bottom half of each bar represents the number of users who
decided to keep it after being asked to read through each short
description. Solid colors indicate that all users either kept or removed
the program. By looking at Figure 7, one can see that users decisions
to install were generally consistent within each program group across
all treatments. For example, we can see that in the case of Google,
roughly 90% of all users across treatments chose to keep the toolbar,
where as in Weatherscope all users chose to remove it.

100

% of installations removed vs kept per treatment and program

90
80
Percentage

70

Eula - Remain
Eula Remove
Generic + EULA remain
Generic + EULA Remove
Short + EULA Remain
EULA + Short Remove

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
KaZaA

Edonkey

webShots

WeatherScope

Google

Figure 7: Programs Removed v. Programs Kept
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Control
Short notice
Generic notice

Regretted
installing
19 (52%)
13 (37%)
11 (35%)
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Regretted not
installing
2
2
0

Table 9: Installation Regret per Notice condition (Number of
installations regretted)
We found (see table 10) that users in the two notice conditions had
lower levels of regret compared to the control condition. Results
between these notice conditions were not statistically significant, but
supported by participant comments in the post-study interview.

Control
Short notice
Generic notice

Low Regret
Applications
6
6
1

High Regret
Applications
13
5
9

Table 10: Regret for “low regret” versus “high regret”
applications
We also studied whether the different notice conditions influenced
users by preventing them from installing applications that were
deemed “high regret” by the community.
Table 11 shows that the number of “high regret” installs is similar
for both the short and generic notices and 6-7 programs less compared
to the control case. Participants also installed more programs that the
community considered “low regret” in the short notice case, but fewer
programs in the generic case. This may be due to the “warning” rather
than “informing” character of the generic Microsoft notice that may
have scared participants away.
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Installed “useful”
Control
Short notice
Generic notice

18
21
16

[Vol. 2:2

Installed “not
useful”
15
8
9

Table 11: Installation of “useful” versus “not useful” applications
F. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, READING NOTICE AND REGRET
The results from measuring regret seemed to suggest that the
additional warnings may have had some effect on user behavior.
Although for the small number of participants we had per treatment,
there was no statistical significance between treatments for regret. The
data and post study interviews seemed to suggest that for users who
did read the shorter notices, they may have had some effect in
matching or reaffirming their preferences, thereby decreasing
instances of regret. This seemed contrary to what we had observed.
As shown in the tables on installation behavior, users generally
ignored all notices and seemed unlikely to stop an installation once
they had started it. The number of regret cases we observed was too
small to perform statistical analysis on beyond simple descriptive
statistics. However, we decided to look more closely at anecdotal
evidence of how regret, prior experience, and reading notices and user
comments were related to help motivate further studies.
Table 12 below summarizes regret by users who had indicated they
had prior experience with an application or not. In cases where users
had prior experience with a program, one would expect regret to be
lower. Because we chose programs that were popular, it is conceivable
that users had already formed opinions about an application before
they installed it.
In Table 12 we see that overall, users who had prior experience
with a program did seem to have lower regret (13% and 23%
compared to 50% for the control). In addition, they seemed to have
lower regret in each group as well (13% compared to 25% for the
generic notices, and 23% compared to 50% for the short notices).
The next column shows the number of users who expressed regret
who were also either influenced or not influenced by the notice. The
next columns show how many of those users regretted their
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installation per program. By comparing the grey bands with the bands
below it, we can see that regret for those unfamiliar with an
application seems to be higher than those who claim they were
influenced by prior knowledge of the application. It is interesting to
note though, that in all cases the incidence of regret for the notice
treatments is still less than the control.
T o ta l
in c id e n c e s
o f re g re t
C o n tro l
(B a s elin e )

24 of 50
-5 0 %

# o f u sers

10

10 of 45
G e n e ric

-2 2 %

O f th es e u se rs , th e # o f tim es th a t th e y ex p re s se d re g re t p e r
p ro g ra m
E d o n k ey
G o o g le K a Z a A
W e a th e rS c o p e
W e b S h o ts
T o o lb a r
8 of 10
-8 0 %

1 of 10
-1 0 %

4 of 10
-4 0 %

6 of 10
-6 0 %

5 of 10
-5 0 %

2 of 9

0

3 of 9

5 of 9

0

-2 2 %

0%

-3 3 %

-5 5 %

0%

In f l u e n c e d b y
p rio r ex p e rie n c e

2 of 15

9
3 of 9

0

0

1 of 3

1 of 3

0

-1 3 %

(~ 3 3 % )

0%

0%

-3 3 %

-3 3 %

0%

N o t in f lu e n c e d
b y p rio r
ex p e rie n c e

8 of 30

6 of 9

2 of 6

0

2 of 6

4 of 6

0

-2 6 %

(~ 6 7 % )

-3 3 %

0%

-3 3 %

-6 6 %

0%

5 of 10

2 of 10

2 of 10

3 of 10

4 of 10

-5 0 %

-2 0 %

-2 0 %

-3 0 %

-4 0 %

3 of 6

1 of 6

0

0

3 of 6

16 of 50
S h o rt N o tic e

-3 2 %

10
6 of 10

In f l u e n c e d b y
p rio r ex p e rie n c e

7 of 30
-2 3 %

-6 0 %

-5 0 %

-1 6 %

0%

0%

-5 0 %

N o t in f lu e n c e d
b y p rio r
ex p e rie n c e

9 of 20

4 of 10

2 of 4

1 of 4

2 of 4

3 of 4

1 of 4

-5 0 %

-4 0 %

-5 0 %

-2 5 %

-5 0 %

-7 5 %

-2 5 %

Table 12
Below we will quickly summarize some of the additional
anecdotal findings from our data.
1. READING NOTICE AND REGRET
We found that participants, who looked at short notices, generally
had less regret than those who did not, although not by a large margin.
We noted a similar result with the generic notice treatment.
2. INFLUENCE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND SHORT NOTICE ON REGRET
We found that users who indicated that they were influenced by
both prior knowledge and the short notice were less likely to
experience regret. In addition, we found that this was the case for
programs that were both installed and not installed. For example, in
the case of KaZaA, six users in the short notice condition claimed to
have heard of KaZaA, and five of them mentioned being influenced by
their previous experience. In addition, they mentioned that the short
notice influenced their decision as well. It is interesting to note that of
the users who did not change their mind in this case (5 out of 6), they
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were almost evenly split between those who installed KaZaA and
those who did not (three installed, two did not). This implies that in
some cases, the short notice is useful in affirming users’ belief or
experience of a given product. Looking back at these users responses,
we discovered that they found the short notices useful, even though
their offer merely confirmed what the users claimed they already
knew.
F. ANALYZING TRADEOFFS
In our study, users were asked to evaluate the P2P filesharing
programs: KaZaA and Edonkey. P2P programs were largely
considered a “must have” application by our user population.
Generally, every user installed at least one, but rarely installed both.
This leads us to wonder what factors influenced the choice between
the two programs. Installations of these programs across all treatments
were roughly split in half (~50% installed KaZaA, ~60% installed
Edonkey). We found that users considered their previous experience
with a program(s), referrals from ‘experts’ they know, and/or other
means of comparison. We summarize these findings below.
1. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
Our users were more familiar with KaZaA than Edonkey. 92% had
heard of KaZaA. 82% mentioned that they had prior knowledge or
experience with KaZaA, which contributed to their decision to install
it or not. Only 18% mentioned that they had heard of Edonkey, with
only 11% saying this factor had an effect on their decision to install.
Users familiar with KaZaA, ranged from people who found it “useful
to get what I want” to those who had negative associations, “I had it
and it crashed my computer. I had to reinstall everything,” and also “I
had too many popups.” In the case of Edonkey, users who were
familiar with it commented more on functionality, stating “I can find
what I want.” It was interesting to note that if negative reactions alone
accounted for users’ decisions to install KaZaA, then the installation
would be less than the 50% we observed. In eight cases, users decided
to either not even open KaZaA, or terminated the installation
immediately after opening the program, as opposed to zero cases in
Edonkey. Users seemed to be employing some criteria, in addition to
prior experience, so we examined the nature of these comparisons.
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2. COMPARISON
Users generally relied on several factors to compare programs,
including the short and generic notices. In the control group, 9 out of
10 users chose Edonkey, while only 2 of 10 chose KaZaA. In the
additional notice cases (short and generic), installation of Edonkey
dropped to roughly the same as KaZaA (4 to 6 installs in the Generic
case, and 6 to 5 installs in the Short Notice case). In the case of
Edonkey, with which our user base was less familiar, users exhibited
more initial caution in installing this program, and relied more heavily
on other cues during the install process. One user noted, “I didn’t
know what it was, I saw the unknown program warning and decided
that I wouldn’t install it.” 3 of the 8 users in the Generic warning
treatment stopped their installation after seeing the generic warning
popup, as opposed to 0 in KaZaA, a more familiar program. In the
short notice case, equal numbers of users stopped at the short notice.
In post-study questions about installation decisions, we found that
users tried to use the short notices to compare the features and tradeoffs of the two programs. One common feature among the two
programs was “popups” and some users mentioned “spyware” in the
post-study interview. Some users would choose the program that they
felt was more useful, and rely on tools like Google Toolbar to block
popups that the program would provide. “[Popups] are a necessary
evil, but I got [Google Toolbar] to block them so they won’t be
annoying.” We found that users also used the short notices during the
post study interview to compare programs when they were asked
whether they regretted installing the program or not. We found that
users would use short notices to measure tradeoffs between the two
programs, and sometimes reverse their decisions about which program
to install.
3. COMMON DISCLOSURE PROBLEM
The KaZaA EULA was more vague than the Edonkey EULA.
Consequently the KaZaA short notice tended to be more vague than
the Edonkey short notice. We found that when users compared the
programs as presented in the short notices, they often tried to choose
the software that would limit their exposure to third party software and
advertisements, while providing the desired functionality. The
inconsistency between disclosures in the KaZaA and Edonkey notices
was magnified by the short notice treatment. This led to a perverse
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result, where users seeking to limit spyware-like behavior ended up
choosing the more invasive program. Providing a common means of
describing the add-ons and attributes each program installs would
assist users in their comparisons, and help them to make choices more
closely aligned with their values. This suggests that in the absence of
a common set of disclosures, short notices could have the unfortunate
effect of subverting users efforts to limit their acquisition of spyware.
Program
Edonkey
Google
Toolbar

Hyperlinks Locations Opt- OptOut In
2
15
6
1
2

4
KaZaA
WeatherScope 0
WebShots

0

9

1

0

78
23

5
0

0
0

6

1

0

Table 13
VI. COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGH OF CURRENT EULA DESIGN
A. WHY ISN’T THE EULA SUFFICIENT?
While our experiment shows that additional research on the utility
of short notices is warranted, EULAs in their current form do little to
inform users about software functionality. As described above, EULAs
are frequently the only method used to inform users about program
functionality. In addition, EULAs are rarely examined or
acknowledged by users during the installation process. Because they
performed so poorly, we decided to use a technique in HCI known as a
cognitive walkthrough to explore the benefits and shortcomings of
current EULA design. While almost all software products have some
form of EULA or TOS, they are by no means all equal in content,
presentation, and deployment. Below we analyze the EULAs
presented with the software used in our study.
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH EULAS
EULAs serve a dual purpose of providing users with information
regarding their choices as well as providing software vendors

2006]

GOOD, ET AL.

337

protection from legal liability. Given their perceived role in contract
formation, it is important for practitioners, policy-makers, and courts
to understand the limits of EULAs as a tool for conveying information
to consumers. Regulating agencies have not created a set of guidelines
for software EULAs. There is a general perception that EULAs are
ineffective at least in part because consumers don’t read them.
Anecdotal evidence supports this impression. For example, one
software provider included a $1000 cash prize offer in the EULA that
was displayed during each software installation, it took 4 months and
3,000 downloads of the software for someone to notice the clause and
claim the prize [17].
1. ANATOMY OF A EULA
Based on previous work and anecdotal evidence, we believed that
EULAs are ineffective in communicating information to users by
design. To explore this hypothesis, we decided to categorize and
analyze the current methods software vendors employ in EULAs to
inform users. We research aspects of the design that contribute to their
ineffectiveness.
We looked at the software EULAs in the five programs used in our
study, and focused on features—such as font size, readability, length
and time to read—considered important in the regulatory efforts
examining notices discussed above. We looked at additional factors
such as the number of screens devoted to the EULA during
installation, the method of presenting the EULA (scroll box, drop
down, outside link), and options for controlling third party software or
internal features that displayed advertisements, transmitted user
information or modified existing settings (such as the homepage). We
were interested in how users interacted with the EULAs, as well as
how frequently they noticed or used the various strategies for
controlling their desktop experience.
2. EULAS AND TOS APPEARANCE
Our participants found EULAs unhelpful. They stated that the
“font was too small,” they were “too long,” and “full of legal mumbojumbo.” A few users had read parts of EULAs carefully on one
occasion, but eventually gave up on reading them because they were
long and confusing. Our participants had several suggestions about
how EULA presentations can be improved. Most notably they wanted
EULAs to be “shorter, easier to read, and in very accessible language.”
One participant stated that she would like to see something “that
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would tell you exactly what you want to know. [It would] provide a
summary first, bold whatever is important, bold what is in the
software, who is using it, and say if it is safe to download.”
A.

CURRENT EULA DESIGN

In analyzing the five EULAs, we documented common strategies
for gathering consent and informing users in the program during
installation. (We believe these are representative of strategies broadly
employed across the software industry.) In the table below [Table 16],
we list the strategies as well as their frequency of occurrence for each
program [Tables 13]. These strategies are described below:

•

Scroll Box containing EULA text – Users are
provided the text of the EULA agreement in a scroll
box.
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•

Force a choice to move to the next screen – This
choice can be implied (users are connecting to a
decision by clicking next) or strict (Users cannot
proceed to the next screen before they make a choice
about some feature or click some confirmation
screen).

•

Hyperlinks to outside sites and policies – Users are
provided clickable links to additional EULAs and
policies pertaining to the program (i.e., privacy
policies, terms of service, etc.)

•

Locations of third parties and policies – Users are
provided information about the location of
additional information pertaining to the program,
such as laws, arbitration rules, but are not able to
access it by via a hyperlink.
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Figure 8: Example of a program describing advertising it installs
•

Opt-out options- Users are provided checkboxes or
radio buttons as a means to opt-out of features that
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modify existing settings (home page), transmit user
information or add-ons from third part vendors that
send information or provide advertisements.

Figure 9: Example of a notice using opt-out
•

Opt-In option – Users are provided checkboxes or
radio buttons as a means to opt-in of features that
modify existing settings (home page), transmit user
information or add-ons from third part vendors that
send information or provide advertisements.

[Vol. 2:2

2006]

GOOD, ET AL.

341

Figure 10: Example of a notice using opt-in
Program

Total
EULA
words in
program

Edonkey
Google ToolBar
KaZaA
WeatherScope
WebShots

2745
1922
17458
2856
1374

Total
EULA
words in
first
order
links
919
504
193
N/A
N/A

Total
EULA
words

Estimated
time to
read17 in
minutes

3664
2426
17651
2856
1374

30.53
20.21
147.1
23.8
11.45

Table 14

17

Based on 120 efficient words per minute (ewpm) for the average reader.
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Because the text box EULA was a common means of providing
information, we examined them in more detail. We compiled a word
count of each EULA, calculated the average words per screen, and
estimated the time it required to read them [Table 14]. In our test, no
user read an entire EULA, or even substantial portions of it. At best,
they would scan for keywords, or try to find key sections that were
interesting. Links to external sites were only clicked five times, (5%).
When available, users availed themselves of the opt-out option over
half of the time (52.7%). The option was only available for 3/5 of the
applications we looked at.
Opt-out of
Go to any
any choices external links

Program

Hyperlinks

Locations

Opt-Out

Opt-In

Edonkey

2

15

6

1

46.40%

0%

Google Toolbar

2

9

1

0

60.70%

3.60%

KaZaA

4

78

0

0

N/A

14%

WeatherScope
WebShots

0
0

23
6

0
1

0
0

N/A
50%

N/A
N/A

Total

8

131

8

1

52.37%

5.87%

Table 15
Program

Total
Screen
Count

Forced
Choice
Implicit

Forced
Choice
Strict

Scroll
Box
EULA

7

Install
Screens
Dedicated
to EULAs
2

Edonkey
Google
Toolbar
KaZaA
WeatherScope

3

2

2

3
4

2
2

3
3

1
2

1
2

4

1

1

1

1

WebShots 4

1

2

0

1

Table 16
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We also used common readability statistics to estimate the overall
range of readability of the EULAs. We used the Flesh-Kindkaid
reading level test in Microsoft word. Flesch Reading ease is a measure
from 0-100, with a higher score indicating easier reading. We found
that the EULAs analyzed had Reading Ease measures under 40. All
EULAs Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level were grade 12.
3. EULA DESIGN IMPRESSIONS
While we were not able to keep track of the exact time it took
users to install each and every application during the course of our
study, we were able to get a general sense of how long users took to
complete each installation task. In some cases, users completed all of
the installation screens in less than 15-20 seconds, spending less than a
couple of seconds per screen.
In no case did a user take more than 2-3 minutes to install an
application. Users were typically able to complete all installations in
less than 15-20 minutes including the programs actual installation
time. This time span is obviously insufficient for users to read, let
alone comprehend, the EULAs. Indeed, the entire time it took users to
examine, install, and configure all five applications is less than the
time it would take to read any single EULA presented.
In addition to reading times, users confirmed that the text was
written at a level that thwarted their use and understanding.
Compounding this problem, we documented a profound disconnect
between what users expected EULAs to contain and what they
contained in fact. While users recognized that there was some form of
agreement, they had widely different, and generally inaccurate,
impressions about the EULA contents. This mirrors results in earlier
surveys on web privacy. It is important to note that users were not
being lazy or careless, rather they simply believed that the majority of
the information in a EULA did not pertain to them, was too generic, or
standard “legal mumbo-jumbo.”
We join others in concluding that EULAs are ill suited for the task
of conveying information to consumers and obtaining consent. There
is little in the design of EULAs that would suggest they are useful for
informing and educating users. While this is not altogether surprising
for HCI practitioners, EULAs are currently considered the state of the
art in notice and consent, and are routinely enforced by courts. Fixing
EULA design is an important activity with broad implications.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have conducted a user study in a controlled laboratory setup
that immersed users in the task of configuring a desktop computer by
making installation decisions about various software applications.
Each of the programs contained secondary features that presented the
user with various trade-offs. Users had to balance their interest in
potentially desirable features (e.g., screen saver) with privacy,
security, and performance risks of different magnitudes (e.g., transfer
of personally identifying information) that were disclosed in the either
EULA notices or EULA notices in combination with either short
notices or generic warnings. We found that users are often willing to
install programs with potentially harmful behaviors in exchange for
access to software programs with desirable features. Users were
generally unaware of the potentially negative secondary aspects of the
programs they installed and did not read the EULA or ToS notices.
When informed in a post-study interview of the EULA’s contents
participants often regretted their decision to install programs and
indicated a desire to undo their actions.
In the next step we introduced two additional information
conditions (Microsoft SP2 warning and Short Notice) to improve
users’ knowledge and understanding of the EULA terms. Surprisingly,
we did not find a behavioral change in the number of programs
installed. Even users that carefully read the Short Notice statements
were often willing to proceed with the installation of potentially
harmful programs.
In the Short Notice condition, however, users felt better informed,
evinced greater understanding of potential risks of the software during
the post-study interview, and had a better understanding of the EULA
contents and, therefore, program functionality.
We suggest that the improved awareness and reduced regret
indicate that Short Notices move toward a more meaningful notice and
consent experience. However, we strongly believe that mutual assent,
in the legal sense, is largely unachievable given the current state of
notices and law.
Our data suggests that providing for comparison shopping among
programs with similar primary features prior to installation, may lead
to increased focus and evaluation of secondary features that negatively
affect privacy, security, and performance.
HCI approaches that improve notice methods can assist users in
controlling their desktop experience, but alone they are insufficient.

